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Abstract: An economic experiment involving separate sessions in 24 small, tightly knit 
communities reveals that trust is higher where greater trustworthiness is expected and 
lower variance in levels of trustworthiness is perceived. A model in which potential 
trusters behaviour is likened to a risky investment explains nearly fifty percent of the 
variation in their behaviour between communities. The predicted relationships continue 
to exist following the introduction of an additional, important variable relating to 
resettlement into the model, although the precise forms of the relationships vary between 
different types of community. The 24 communities are all Zimbabwean, 18 resettled and 
6 not.  
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1. Introduction   
Trust, we are told, is valuable. It ‘is an important lubricant of a social system. It is 
extremely efficient; it saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other 
people’s word’ (p. 23, Arrow (1974)). Empirically trust has been associated with well 
functioning formal institutions and governments, the emergence of large organisations 
able to reap returns to scale, and with higher rates of economic growth (Fukuyama 
(1997), LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Knack and Keefer 
(1997)). But what is trust and is it an appropriate focus for our interest? Definitions of 
trust generally contain two components. The first is vulnerability: an act of trust involves 
putting oneself in a vulnerable position in the hope of gaining a positive benefit as a 
result. The second is expectation: the potential truster bases his decision on an 
expectation about whether the potential trustee will exploit his vulnerability, given that 
the trustee faces a ‘raw’, as Bacharach and Gambetta (1999) would call it, incentive to 
do so. Thus, Gambetta (1988) describes trust as ‘a threshold point, located on a 
probabilistic distribution’ (pg. 218). The first component describes the type of situation 
in which it is appropriate to talk about trust and is the subject of a debate that I describe 
briefly below. The second relates to its nature. It is on this second, uncontested 
component that I wish to focus. If trust is no more than an expectation, to describe it as 
valuable in and of itself is inappropriate. It is trustworthiness that is of value as an aid to 
efficiency, while trust’s value, like that of other expectations, depends on its accuracy, 
i.e., on whether it is well placed. 
   An expectation is formed with reference to an information set that contains some or 
all of the information that is relevant to the possible future outcomes. This information 
set  affects behaviour through an expectation-forming process. Thus, ceteris paribus, if 
variations in the content of an information set are associated with variations in 
behaviour, it can be taken as evidence that an expectation has been formed and is 
affecting behaviour. With this in mind, the experimental economics literature does 
provide some evidence that trust is a form of expectation. So, for example, Burg, 
Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) (BDM) show how trusters adjust their behaviour in a 
one-shot investment game following the expansion of their information set to include 
the results of earlier investment games, while Yamagishi and Kakiuchi (2000) show 
how trust develops between pairs of players in a modified repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
game following the expansion of their information set as play progresses.  
  While interesting, both of these results relate only to the formation of expectations 
within the context of the experiment being conducted. Thus, both the decision faced by 
the players and their information sets are limited in terms of their complexity. This is 
quite different to the situations faced by people in everyday life; they are likely to have 
more information about potential trustees but to face the problem of deciding what is 
believable, what is relevant, and what weights to apply to possibly contradictory 
information.
1 This paper looks at whether people use information gleaned during 
everyday life to construct trust-like expectations.  
  One way to do this would be to bring ready-made social relations into the context of 
the experiment. Then one could investigate whether players use the information learnt 
during the course of the relations as a basis for their expectations within an experimental 
situation involving trust. Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter (1999) conducted 
                                                            
1 See Bacharach and Gambetta (2000) for an interesting exploration of the complexity of the problem 
faced by potential trusters.   2 
such an experiment. Prior to playing an investment game similar to that devised by 
BDM, they introduced the pairs of players and then asked how well and by what means 
they knew each other. They found that the level of investment by trusters increased with 
the degree of social connection between the players and argued that this was because of 
greater opportunities for post-play punishment. Following Dasgupta (1988), the authors 
interpreted this finding as evidence that social relations and the associated information 
led to enhanced trust. However, this interpretation would be contended by other authors. 
Some, including Hardin (1991) and Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) would argue that 
the social relations in Glaeser et al.’s experiment are reducing the need for rather than 
increasing trust because the opportunity for post-play punishment reduces the 
vulnerability of players who choose to invest. Other authors recognise the need to 
distinguish trusting behavour based on an ability to deter, from trust that has no such 
basis, while still referring to the former as trust. Thus, Weber (1968[1922]) and 
Shapiro, Sheppard and Cheraskin (1992) would say that the relations in Glaeser et al’s 
experiment enhance ‘enforceable trust’ or ‘deterrence-based trust’ respectively.  
  This debate is salient to my question as an expectation based on the knowledge that 
one can deter non-reciprocation is entirely different from an expectation based only on 
information about the disposition of a person. There are certain advantages to focusing 
on the latter, not least of all because it can serve as a baseline: trust in the absence of any 
other mechanism that could facilitate cooperation. This makes it a good place to start the 
current investigation and renders it necessary to find an alternative research approach to 
that of Glaeser et al.   
  To this end, I present the findings from an economic experiment in which social 
relations and associated information are brought into the context of an economic 
experiment in such a way that the vulnerability of those who choose to behave in a 
trusting manner is nevertheless maintained. The experiment, which involved BDM’s 
one shot investment game, was played in 24 small, tightly knit, communities. In each 
of the 24 community-specific sessions the players did not know the precise identity of 
the person they were paired with but did know that it was someone from their own 
community. Hence, while there was no easy means at their disposal to deter 
untrustworthy behaviour, they would have had some information emanating from their 
everyday lives about the dispositions of the pool of people from which their partner 
was drawn. The results of this experiment suggest that people do indeed use 
information gleaned during their everyday lives to create expectations and guide their 
decisions in strategic situations. In communities where trustworthiness waslow, 
players behaved in a less trusting manner. In addition, consistent with the joint 
hypothesis that players are risk averse and take account of information gleaned during 
their everyday lives, in communities where there was a higher variance in 
trustworthiness, players behaved in a less trusting manner.   
  Before proceeding, it is useful to dwell briefly on what this paper is not about. 
Throughout the analysis I simply take it as given that people behave trustworthily to 
varying degrees. This renders it rational to, at least, contemplate trusting behaviour. 
For discussions about the origins and rationality of trustworthiness see, for example, 
Hardin (1991), Hausman (1998), and Bacharach and Gambetta (2000). 
  The paper contains five sections. Following this introduction, section 2 contains a 
description of the experimental design. In section 3 I describe the framework used in the 
data analysis. The results are presented in Section 4. After briefly describing the data,  3 
this section provides a circumspect comparison of my results with those of BDM and 
another US replication of the investment game by Cox (2000). Then comes a more 
detailed analysis of  trustees’ behaviour in the 24 Zimbabwean communities. This feeds 
into the analysis of the Zimbabwean trusters’ behaviour which generates the key results 
of the paper. Finally in this section, I exploit the fact that 18 of the 24 villages are the 
consequence of a resettlement exercise to explore the robustness of these key results. 
Section 5 concludes with some comments about the implications of the results for past 
and future research. 
 
2. Experimental Design 
  BDMs investment game is a one shot game played by pairs of subjects. Both 
players are given an initial endowment of money. The first player has the option of 
giving some of his/her money to the second player, i.e., of making an investment. 
Whatever he/she chooses to invest is tripled before being given to the second player. 
The second player then has the option of giving some portion of the tripled amount back 
to the first player. The one-shot nature of the game combined with player anonymity, 
implies that there is no possibility that reputation mechanisms based on repeated 
interactions, contractual pre-commitments or potential threats of punishment are 
generating the results. It ensures that first players who chose to invest more than zero are 
vulnerable to exploitation by the second player. The more they invest, the greater their 
potential return, but the greater their vulnerability.  
  In my version of the game each player’s initial endowment was 20 Zimbabwean 
dollars units and all play was conducted in Zim$5 notes.
2 Thus, the first player had to 
choose s 0 S, where S = {0, 5, 10, 15, 20}. The choice of s by the first player determined 
the '(s) subgame, in which the second player chose r 0 R, where R(s) = {0, 5, 10, 15, ..., 
3s}. This game was played once in each of 24 sessions. Each session was held in a 
different Zimbabwean village. Each player was paired with someone from their own 
village and informed accordingly. In each village there were between 4 and 11 pairs of 
volunteers playing the BDM game. A total of 141 pairs played this game. In every 
session there were other volunteers present who were playing an ultimatum game 
instead. Each volunteer came from a different household and attended the experimental 
session in their own village.
3 Just under half of the volunteers (47 percent) were female 
and just over half (52 percent) were heads of households. The allocation of partners, 
games and roles was determined randomly prior to the start of each session.  
  Because of the relatively low level of education and the potentially high incidence of 
illiteracy among subjects, experimenters working in developing countries have to adopt 
procedures that deviate significantly from those typically adopted in Europe and the US. 
I adopted a procedural design similar to Henrich’s (2000). During a pilot exercise a 
                                                            
2 This lead to average earnings of approximately half a day’s casual wage. The exchange rate at the time 
of the sessions was in the region of 50 Zim $ per GB pound. 
3 The households from which the players originate are participants in an on-going assessment of the effects 
of resettlement in Zimbabwe. Each household in the assessment was asked to send one adult (above the 
age of 14) volunteer to the session in their village. In 13 of the villages the assessment and, hence, the 
experiment involve all households. In the remaining 11 a random sample of households is involved. The 
chairman or headman of each village was charged with the duty of ensuring that the volunteers arrived at 
the session. They were told that the volunteers would be playing games and could win some money.  4 
script for the game was developed in Shona, the local language in all the villages.
 4 The 
script contained three components: a detailed and repetitive description of the game; a 
set of examples and questions showing how particular combinations of decisions yield 
particular pay-offs for each player; and, for second players only, a description of what 
their corresponding first players had decided to do. One set of examples was used for all 
first players and another for all second players. These were designed to demonstrate the 
key features of the games, while minimising the extent to which players might be led to 
behave in a certain way. Once the pilot was over the script was closely adhered to. When 
players had questions, the relevant part of the script was repeated. Players who could not 
demonstrate that they understood were not allowed to play. The need to test players’ 
understanding verbally rendered a double blind procedure impractical. Hence, potential 
subject-experimenter effects had to be considered.
5 To minimise the impact of such 
effects on the comparative results, great care was taken to follow the same procedure 
with each player. This notwithstanding, different subject-experimenter effects on male 
and female players could have biased the results.
6 The proportion of women volunteers 
varied from 14.3 percent to 81.3 percent across village sessions. Econometric methods 
were used, ex post, to test and control for this possible source of bias. 
  In each session the players of both games were gathered together. One-by-one they 
were called to meet with the experimenter and a Shona-speaking research assistant (RA) 
in private. In order to avoid player contamination the players were told nothing about the 
games prior to their individual meetings with the experimenter and RA. Within villages, 
those who had already played were not allowed contact with those who were still 
waiting. Where there was a risk of contamination between villages, sessions were held 
on the same or consecutive days. Interviews with players and other villagers indicated 
that between-village contamination did not occur. Finally, in the villages where there 
were relatively few players, their sense of anonymity might have been partially 
compromised.
7 While no experimental solution could be applied, econometric methods 
were used, ex post, to test and control for this possibility. 
    
3. Analytical Framework 
  If trust is, in essence, an expectation then we should be able to model first player’s 
behaviour as an investment decision under uncertainty. Thus, let the random variable 
r ~ with probability distribution S defined on R(s) represent a the first player’s 
expectation of the amount that will be returned by the second player in subgame '(s). 
Assuming that their utilities can be represented by a constant relative risk aversion utility 
function, the first players’ problem can then be written as  


















     (1) 
where g is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. This implies that the chosen s will 
depend positively on the expected value of r ~  and, if the players are risk averse, 
                                                            
4 Data from the 16 pairs of players in the pilot have been included throughout the analysis. Excluding these 
observations from the analysis does not alter any of the conclusions.  
 5 Hoffman et al. (1994) provide evidence that subject/experimenter anonymity affects behavior. However, 
Roth (1995) reviews several other studies that report the opposite.  
6 Eagly and Crowley (1986) found that subject-experimenter effects can differ for men and women. 
7 Hoffman et al. (1996) show that reduced subject/subject anonymity leads to greater observed generosity.  5 
negatively on the perceived variance of r ~ . Linearizing the resulting investment function 
yields 
    s = "0 + "1 E(r ~ ) + "2 
2
~ r σ      (2) 
If the theory holds, when this function is estimated, "1 will be positive and, if the players 
are also risk averse, "2 will be negative.  
  Data on each first player’s expectation and perceived variance of r ~ does not exist. 
However, the design of the experiment is such that the actual responses of the second 
players can be used to construct proxies for both E(r ~ ) and 
2
~ r σ . This approach is 
potentially problematic as the set of possible responses from which each second player 
chooses is determined by the choice made by the corresponding first player. Thus, using 
second players’ actual responses to construct an explanatory variable to include in the 
analysis of first players’ behaviour could lead to problems of reverse causality and 
endogeneity. An alternative base for these two explanatory variables is the proportional 
response, i.e., the ratio r/s. This is attractive for two reasons. First, certain values of the 
proportional response lend themselves to easy interpretation. A proportional response of 
zero corresponds to self-interested, money maximization, a proportional response of one 
corresponds to what one might call ‘pure reciprocity’, i.e., returning exactly what was 
given, and a proportional response of two corresponds to what one might call ‘pure 
sharing’, i.e., to dividing the total money in the game equally.
8 These focal points might 
be as attractive to the players as they are to the author and so assume an important role 
in determining their behaviour and expectations. Second, the ratio r/s is bound by 0 and 
3, whatever the value of s. This reduces but does not eliminate the possibility of a 
reverse causal link; a second player might give a higher proportional response to a more 
trusting first player. To eliminate this possibility, I conduct an analysis of second player 
behaviour, estimating both  
          r = b0 + b1 s + e1   and     
s
r
 = c0 + c1 s + e2               (3a, 3b) 
where the error terms, e1 and e2, are assumed to be i.i.d. normal, before moving on to the 
analysis of first player behaviour. As long as r/s is found not to depend on s, this 
analysis can be based on an estimation of the following   
















 + =     (4) 
where s is the village mean first players’ choice,  ) / ( s r  is the village mean proportional 
response by second players,  ) / var( s r is the village-level variance in the proportional 
responses, and e3 is assumed to be i.i.d. normal. This analysis must be conducted at the 
village level because of the way in which the explanatory variables are constructed. If a1 
is significantly greater than zero it lends support to the idea that first players are forming 
expectations and investing accordingly, i.e., that trust is an expectation. If a2 is 
significantly less than zero it lends further support to these ideas, while also indicating 
that the players are risk averse.  
                                                            
8 After the first player has chosen s, she has 20 – s and the second player has 20 + 3s making the total 
money in the game 40 + 2s. If the second player chooses to return r = 2s  (a proportional response of 2), 
she is left with 20 + s and the first player ends up with 20 – s + 2s = 20 + s.  6 
  Each of the equations is estimated as it is presented above and then re-estimated 
including  female, a dummy which takes the value one for female players and zero 
otherwise, and session, the number of volunteers present in the session that the player 
attended, as additional explanatory variables. In some cases still further specifications 
are presented in order to explore issues relevant to the primary investigation.   
 
4. Results  
  Figure 1 shows the distribution of investments made by the 141 first players. There is 
one modal investment at Zim$10, half of the initial endowment. Figure 2 shows the 
distribution of proportional responses made by the 129 second players who received 
positive, tripled investments. There are three modes at zero, one, and two, indicating that 
these values did indeed serve as focal points for the players. Whether this is because 
these values are associated with behavioural norms remains to be seen, although the 
following comparison suggests not. 
 
4.1 Comparison with results of other BDM games 
Table 1 contains comparable summary statistics for the Zimbabwean BDM games and 
those conducted in the US by BDM and Cox (2000). Due to the impracticality of a 
double blind procedure in Zimbabwe, one must exercise caution when conducting the 
comparison. This notwithstanding, the comparison serves as a useful check on whether 
efforts to make the game comprehensible to Zimbabwean villagers, who rarely act 
anonymously or face situations in which payoff’s depend on abstract mathematics, 
succeeded.  
  Both BDM and Cox observed very few first players investing zero (6 and 3 percent 
respectively). A marginally greater proportion (9 percent) of the Zimbabwean first 
players invested nothing. Further, the mean investment by Zimbabwean first players was 
lower as a proportion of their initial endowment than those observed in the two US 
experiments (43 percent as opposed to 52 and 60 percent). On average, second players 
in the BDM experiment returned less than the first players invested (0.89), while those 
in Cox’s and the Zimbabwean games returned more (1.17 and 1.28 percent 
respectively). The Zimbabwean second players returned a marginally higher proportion 
than Cox’s.   
  Finally, the tri-modal distribution observed in Figure 2 is not present in either the 
BDM or Cox’s data. The former has a mode at zero only and in the latter over fifty 
percent of the second players’ proportional responses fall between one and two and 
twenty percent fall between zero and one. This casts some doubt on the hypothesis that 
the tri-modal distribution in Zimbabwe is the result of ‘competition’ between 
behavioural norms. Instead, it could be due to the measures taken to ensure that players 
understood the game. While efforts were made to minimise the extent to which we 
biased players’ responses to any one of the focal responses, they did feature heavily in 
the examples because they involved easier mathematics. This notwithstanding, the 
results of the comparison give us no reason to doubt the understanding of the 
Zimbabwean players.  
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4.2 The trustworthiness of the second players 
Table 2 contains the results of a series of regressions based on the responses of the 129 
second players who received positive tripled investments from their respective first 
players. The top half of the table contains the regressions that take r, the amount of 
money returned by the second player, as the dependent variable. The bottom half of the 
table contains the regressions that take r/s, the proportional response, as the dependent 
variable. The regressions in the first column correspond exactly to equations (3a) and 
(3b) above. The coefficient on s is significantly greater than zero (0.01 level) in the 
regressions that takes r as its dependent variable and indistinguishable from zero (0.1 
level) in the regression that takes r/s as its dependent variable. Allowing standard errors 
to vary between villages does not significantly alter these results. Introducing the square 
of r as an additional explanatory variable neither alters these results nor improves the fit 
of the model.  
  In the second column female and session are included as additional explanatory 
variables. Both have negative and significant coefficients, although the coefficients on 
session become insignificant if the standard errors are allowed to vary between villages. 
In the third column session is replaced with a set of village dummies. In both regressions 
these are jointly significant (0.1 level for r and 0.05 for r/s) indicating that there is 
significant variation in second player behaviour between villages. Allowing standard 
errors to vary between villages does not significantly alter these results.  
 
4.3 The investment behaviour of the first players 
Given no evidence that r/s depends on s, we can use the former to derive explanatory 
variables for our analysis of first players’ behaviour. Table 3 contains the results of a 
series of regressions based on the investments made by the 141 first players. Before 
turning to the estimation of equation (4), consider the individual-level regression in the 
first column of Table 3. Here, female and a set of village dummies are the only 
explanatory variables. The dummies are jointly highly significant (0.001 level), while 
the coefficient on female is insignificant. The apparent irrelevance of our only 
individual-level variable combined with evidence of significant between-village 
variations indicates that little information will be lost as we move to the village-level 
analysis.  
  The regressions in the second column of Table 3 correspond exactly to equation (4). 
The coefficient on  ) / ( s r  is positive and significantly greater than zero (0.05 level) and 
the coefficient on  ) / var( s r is negative and significantly less than zero (0.1 level). In the 
third column femalep, the proportion of females among first players from that village, 
and session are introduced. This does not alter the main results although the coefficient 
on session is positive and significant (0.1 level).  
  These results support the hypotheses that first players’ behaviour can be modelled as 
a risky investment, that they are risk averse, and that trust is essentially an expectation. It 
also indicates that strategic information is accumulated as a result of village life.  
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4.4. Testing the robustness of the key results 
One way to further test the verisimilitude of this model is to introduce additional, 
potentially important, variables into the analysis. Here, I use the fact that 18 of the 24 
villages are the result of a resettlement exercise that took place in the early 1980s, to 
generate an additional village-level variable, resettled, that takes the value one for 
resettled villages and zero otherwise. The resettled villages differ from their 
traditional counterparts in many ways. Most importantly in the context of the current 
analysis, while in traditional Zimbabwean villages everyone is related to everyone else 
by blood or marriage with very few exceptions, in the resettled villages included in the 
study this is not the case. This is because the resettlement in the early 1980s involved 
applications by individual households, who were then assigned to villages with no 
regard for the whereabouts of their kinsmen. Exceptions to this rule are rare. 
    Using this variable, I seek to answer two questions. First, and most importantly, do 
the key results presented in section 4.3 continue to hold following the inclusion of 
another, potentially important, variable in the model? And second, can variations in first 
player behaviour between traditional and resettled villages be explained in terms of 
movements along the functions estimated in section 4.3? The potential importance of 
resettlement is evident from the comparison of the mean levels of investment in 
traditional and resettled villages presented in Table 4. The mean investments by first 
players in traditional and resettled villages are Zim$10.47 and Zim$8.03 respectively 
and the difference is significantly greater than zero (0.05 level). That there is a 
difference between the two distributions is confirmed by the result of an Epps-Singleton 
test.
9    
   The first column of Table 5 presents the results of a regression that includes resettled 
as and additional explanatory variable. Including this variable does not alter the key 
results presented above. However, the coefficient on the resettled dummy is 
significantly greater than zero (0.1 level). In the second column, in an effort to preserve 
scarce degrees of freedom, femalep  and session are excluded. The significance of 
resettled increases as a result. Then, in the third column two interaction terms, one 
between resettled and  ) / ( s r  and one between resettled and  ) / var( s r , are introduced. 
The coefficients on both of these interaction terms are significant (0.05 level and 0.1 
level respectively). Their inclusion also increases the significance of the coefficients on 
) / ( s r  and  resettled, although the coefficient on  ) / var( s r  is rendered insignificant. 
Further, the fit of the model has improved considerably. It now explains nearly 50 
percent of the variation if first players’ behaviour between villages.  
  These results suggest that variations in first player behaviour between traditional and 
resettled villages cannot be explained in terms of movements along the functions 
estimated in section 4.3 above. Instead, the difference in first player behaviour between 
traditional to resettled villages is associated with a change in the position of the 
estimated functions. Resettled villagers, while positively and positively responsive to 
increases in the expected trustworthiness (0.1 level), are less so than traditional 
                                                            
9 The Epps-Singleton (1986) test is a very powerful non-parametric test that is based on the difference 
between the characteristic functions of the two samples being compared.  9 
villagers.
10 In contrast it is only resettled villagers that are negatively and significantly 
responsive to increases in the variance of trustworthiness (0.1 level).
11 
 
5. Conclusions and Final Comments 
This analysis suggests that trust can be appropriately characterised as an expectation. In 
villages where first players might reasonably expect second players to be more 
trustworthy, they invest more. Further, consistent with the joint hypothesis that first 
players are risk averse and trust is an expectation, in villages where first players might 
reasonably perceive a higher variance in second players’ responses, they invest less. 
These relationships continue to exist even after a distinction is made between resettled 
and traditional villages. However, they vary between the two village types. Whether this 
is because the expectation forming process varies or the preferences with which it 
combines to yield player’s decisions varies remains to be seen. Additional research in 
this area could further improve our understanding of the cognitive processes and the 
preference parameters with which trust is associated.  
  That trust is appropriately modelled as an expectation indicates that we should revisit 
some of the earlier empirical results relating higher trust to better economic outcomes. 
These results are generally based on answers to the World Values Survey question ‘In 
general do you believe that people can be trusted?’ answers too which relate more 
closely to the trustworthiness of the respondents than to their degree of trust in others 
(Glaeser  el al (1999)). Hence, the revisit would primarily involve rewriting the 
conclusions so that they link greater trustworthiness rather than higher trust to better 
economic outcomes.  
  The revisit would also need to take account of another issue. Recall that as an   
expectation, the value of trust depends on it being well placed. Further, the ‘accuracy’ of 
trust may have a bearing on the realized value of trustworthiness. If an individual or 
group are trustworthy, but this is not perceived accurately by potential trusters, then 
potentially beneficial exchanges with the individual or group may not take place. That 
responses to the WVS question are linked with better economic outcomes implies that 
trust is at least sometimes well placed, but it tells us nothing about the opportunities that 
are missed and the costs that are incurred when trust is misplaced. Further, it tells us 
nothing about the cognitive processes that are associated with placing trust well. To the 
author’s knowledge, only the study by Bacharach, M., and Gambetta, D. (2000) 
addresses such issues of cognition and, even then, only theoretically. The results 
reported above suggest that this could be a fruitful avenue for future empirical research.  
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Table 1. Comparison of Behaviour in Investment Game observed by Berg et al 
(1995), Cox (1999) and in Zimbabwe 
  Berg et al (1995)  
(no social history) 
Cox (1999) 
(strong social context) 
Zimbabwe 
Number of playing pairs*  32 30  141 
Initial endowment size  10.00   US $  10.00  US $  20.00   Zim $ 
Proportion of first players 







Mean investment by first 













Mean investment as a 







Mean response (expressed as 




    1.17** 
 
1.28 
* Responses are made by second players only when first players invest more than zero. 
** Supplied by J. Cox. 
Table 2: Analysis of Second Players’ Responses 
        1       2       3  
  Coef. s.e.    Coef. s.e.    Coef. s.e.   
Dependent variable = r (money returned by second players)        
Constant  0.371 1.629    4.957 2.333  *  5.403 4.997   
s   1.237 0.179  ***  1.270 0.173  ***  1.026 0.211  *** 
female       -3.384 1.462  **  -3.370 1.559  ** 
session        -0.155 0.074  **      
Joint sig. of village dummies  -    -    0.0001   
Number of observations  129    129    129   
R
2  0.283    0.325    0.492   
Dependent variable = r/s (proportional response)          
Constant  1.286 0.232  ***  1.866 0.328  ***  2.038 0.058  * 
s   -0.001 0.019    0.004 0.018    -0.025 0.023   
female       -0.352 0.177  **  -0.312 0.188  * 
session        -0.021 0.010  **      
Joint sig. of village dummies  -    -    0.0001   
Number of observations  129    129    129   
R
2  0.000    0.055    0.301   
Notes: All standard errors have been corrected using White’s (1980) procedure.  *** - significant at 0.01 
level, ** - significnat at 0.05 level, * - significant at 0.1 level.  
  13 
Table 3: Analysis of First Players’ Investments 
     2      3       4   
  Coef. s.e.    Coef. s.e.    Coef. s.e.   
Constant   4.077 1.921  **  8.344 1.316  ***  3.892 2.183  * 
) / ( s r        1.922 0.839  **  1.941 0.901  ** 
) / var( s r        -2.474 1.251  *  -2.640 1.492  * 
female  -0.128 0.884             
femalep            3.993 2.534   
session             0.135 0.067  * 
Joint sig. of village dummies  0.0003    -    -   
Number of observations  141    24    24   
R
2  0.349    0.183    0.331   
 Notes: All standard errors have been corrected using White’s (1980) procedure.  *** - significant at 0.01 
level, ** - significant at 0.05 level, * - significant at 0.1 level.  
 
Table 4: Comparison of Mean First Player Behaviour Between Traditional and 
Resettled Villages 
  Traditional Villages  Resettled Villages 
Number of playing pairs   32 109 
Mean investment  (Zim$)  10.47   8.03  
Standard deviation (sd) of investments  5.44 4.57 








Epps-Singleton test for equality of  




Table 5: Introducing Resettlement into the Analysis of First Players’ Investments 
     1        2        3   
 Coef.  s.e.    Coef. s.e.    Coef. s.e.   
Constant   6.554 2.787  **  10.281 1.786  ***  0.781 0.730   
) / ( s r   2.009 0.845  **  1.981 0.815  **  6.855 1.649  *** 
) / var( s r   -2.456 1.376  *  -2.443 1.237  *  1.268 1.600   
femalep  2.431 2.441             
session   0.109 0.064             
resettled  -2.192 1.167  *  -2.722 1.134  **  7.630 1.631  *** 
) / ( s r  x resettled             -5.257 1.860  ** 
) / var( s r  x resettled             -4.099 2.157  * 
Number of observations  24    24    24   
R
2  0.429    0.355    0.467   
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